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With the increasing attention to how monetary policy is communicated has come a focus 
on the scope for diverse messages to arise from the committee making the decision. 
While the existing literature sees the source of such diversity in relation to a ‘correct’ 
decision based on one ‘true’ model, we explore the implications of diversity as being 
instead the norm within a pluralist approach to knowledge. By considering judgement as 
the core of decision-making and uncertainty as conditioning judgement, we develop a 
theory of decision-making by committee under uncertainty. Our case study is the 
Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. We conclude with a hypothesis 
about the tendency to policy inaction in different circumstances, notably where there are 
confident but conflicting judgements within the committee, on the one hand, and where 
there is agreement that a high level of uncertainty clouds judgement, on the other. This 
contrasts with the conventional association of diversity of MPC opinion with uncertainty 
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The purpose of this paper is to consider the implications for policy decision-making of 
diversity of analysis, where this diversity is an integral aspect of pluralist economics in an 
uncertain environment, rather than something which is reducible. It is commonplace now 
to characterise economics as pluralist, having departed from the unifying methodology 
set by general equilibrium theory. This is most evident in the rise of game theory and 
experimental economics, and related debate as to the relative importance of theory and 
evidence. In macroeconomics, a ‘new consensus’ has been identified in the area of the 
mainstream theory of monetary policy (Arestis and Sawyer 2004). But even here some 
fragmentation is becoming apparent again. There has for example been a renewal of 
interest in monetary aggregates, and a renewed element of debate about rational 
expectations (De Grauwe 2008). 
 
The question of which model to use for monetary policy (a question which presumes that 
there is one best model) has made this fragmentation explicit. This is the subject of the 
model uncertainty literature (Dow 2004a). The Bank of England has gone further than 
most, notably in its 1999 account of its approach to models in advocating recourse to a 
range of models, albeit with a focus on one main model (now the BEQM1); while the 
European Central Bank has adopted the controversial two-pillar approach, which leaves 
ample room for judgement. The matter of selecting the appropriate policy action is 
complicated further for those central banks (such as the US Federal Reserve) required to 
pursue more than one goal simultaneously and where the policy decisions are taken by a 
committee whose members may pursue regional interests. Meade and Sheets (2005) show 
that policy makers are influenced by regional economic development and tend to have a 
‘home bias’. The complexity of monetary policy has been increasingly emphasised in the 
mainstream literature ever since the failure of the confident days of the early 1980s when 
it was presumed that a single large model would unambiguously yield the appropriate 
policy action. 
 
Variety of judgement about monetary policy is therefore evident in both academic and 
policy circles. What we want to focus on here is the implications of such variety when the 
institutional arrangement for monetary policy-making is a committee, whose members 
may differ in their analysis. We will focus particularly on the arrangements in the UK, 
whereby the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) reaches decisions by vote rather than 
consensus. There is a growing literature on variety of opinion in monetary policy-making, 
and its implications for decision-making by committee. But, unlike this literature, not 
only do we put much more emphasis on why there should be variety in the first place, we 
argue that what is at stake is the broader question of judgement. 
 
The paper begins with a brief account of the institutional arrangements surrounding 
monetary policy-making, and the ideas current in the literature about decision-making by 
committee. Our focus here is on the explanation for variety of opinion within committees. 
                                                 
1 See http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/other/beqm/index.htm 
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What is important is whether or not variety of opinion is ultimately open to resolution 
(resulting for example only from different skill sets, or information, for example), ie 
whether there is one best model which can feasibly be identified. This is the longstanding 
stance implicit in the established approaches to monetary policy in the context of model 
uncertainty. Yet policy-makers are not so sanguine (King 2007 emphasises the role of 
judgement under uncertainty2), and indeed variety of opinion is a normal feature of how 
dissenting approaches - such as Post Keynesian economics - regard knowledge of the 
economy. We therefore proceed to consider the source of variety of opinion more 
generally in order to explore what is required to justify the conventional stance on the one 
hand, and the dissenting stance that variety of opinion is inevitable on the other. The 
critical factor will prove to be uncertainty, and leading on from this the reasons for its 
presence, and its implications in terms of the necessity for economic judgement and the 
inextricable diversity of such judgement (cf. Dow 2004; Dow, Klaes and Montagnoli 
2007). This is followed by a discussion of the implications for monetary policy of variety 
of judgement in policy-making being made public, as it is in the UK. The paper 
concludes with some reflections on how variety of judgement might more usefully be 
incorporated in the theory of monetary policy. 
 
Monetary Policy by Committee 
While older literature on monetary policy referred to institutional arrangements, and 
particularly relations between the central bank and financial institutions (eg Dow and 
Saville 1988), it became conventional from the 1980s to characterise monetary policy in 
terms of monetary targets, or interest-rate setting. This was the case even where monetary 
policy was established by committee, as in the US. But New Keynesian economics has 
put an emphasis on transparency, such that the statements and documents surrounding 
monetary policy decisions have become a major focus of attention (Blinder et al 2009). 
These wider communications are regarded as important for signalling central bank 
thinking and thus assisting markets in forming expectations about the effects of monetary 
policy, and the future path of monetary policy. 
 
But where monetary policy is made by committee rather than a single individual, there is 
scope for these communications to reveal variety of opinion within the committee. 
Blinder (2004, 2008) in particular has discussed extensively the different institutional 
arrangements operating in different countries: genuinely-collegial committees, 
autocratically-collegial committees, and individualistic committees. He discusses the 
issues surrounding communication of variety of opinion within each type of committee. 
But the source of variety of opinion is left rather vague. Blinder refers to difference of 
‘approach’ among different committee members, particularly as between those with 
academic backgrounds and those with business backgrounds. This difference may reflect 
different knowledge and information, or different methods of analysis (‘decision-making  
                                                 
2 King’s analysis of uncertainty differs from ours, however, in that he sees it as the result of ‘shocks’ rather 
than, as we see it, the general case. 
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heuristics’3) (see further Blinder 2004, chapter 2). Tucker (2008) similarly refers to the 
‘fresh air’ which new members may bring to a committee. But the epistemological basis 
for such differences is not explored. 
 
Gerlach-Kristen (2006) offers similar explanations for difference in views within the 
committee. Like Blinder she explores the possibility that there may be a difference in 
preferences, but, as in the case of the MPC with its externally-set inflation target, she 
concludes that there is no scope for this to apply. Second there may be different skills 
represented in the committee, reflected in the variance of forecast errors. Third there may 
be different perceptions of potential output; this may result not only from data uncertainty 
but also from different interpretations of the same data. In discussing the benefits of 
committee deliberation where there is variety of opinion, Gerlach-Kristen (2003) likewise 
focuses on (stochastic) differences of opinion on errors and on parameter values (with 
respect to a particular model). Indeed Tucker (2008) emphasises the significance of all 
MPC members basing their judgements on a shared core model and shared forecasts. 
Gerlach-Kristen concludes that disagreements arise primarily (where there is rational, 
non-strategic behaviour) from information not being pooled effectively. This 
interpretation is reinforced by her analysis (Gerlach-Kristen 2004) of MPC voting 
patterns, which suggests that, where there are differences, these are over the timing of 
members coming to a particular policy conclusion (so that dissenting votes tend to be 
good predictors of future changes in policy stance). 
 
Chappell et al. (1997) estimate reaction functions for each FOMC member. The results 
suggest that there is considerable diversity across members and they tend to vote 
systematically for tighter or looser monetary policy. ‘This evidence suggests that 
policymakers may hold different views of the optimal level of inflation and/or potential 
output that make them disagree about the desirable level of interest rates’ (Gerlach-
Kristen 2008: 120). A similar exercise has been conducted by Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 
(2008) for the Bank of England MPC. They conclude that ‘MPC members are fairly 
homogeneous in their policy preferences, but there are systematic quantitative differences 
in their policy reaction functions that are related to the nature of their membership and 
career background’ (Riboni and Ruge-Murcia 2008: 213). 
 
Gerlach-Kristen’s explanations for difference of opinion support the conventional view 
that there is one best model and set of forecasts, but that different committee members 
arrive there at different speeds, and with different skills and information. Blinder and 
Tucker raise the possibility that there could in addition be different understandings of the 
economic process, but leave this possibility unexplored. There is general agreement that a 
committee structure, which draws on different opinions (drawing on different information 
and skills), provides a more robust approach to monetary policy than reliance on a single 
opinion. Yet it is fundamental whether or not such differences challenge the notion of one 
                                                 
3 Rather than exploring this further, Blinder (2004: 42) supports this statement with reference to an 
unpublished source which notes that the notion of differing heuristics has wide acceptance in the 
organisational behaviour literature. 
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best analysis. We explore the source of difference of opinion below, putting particular 
focus on the nature and significance of uncertainty (drawing on Dow, Klaes and 
Montagnoli 2007). 
 
Variety of Opinion and Uncertainty 
While the interest in central bank communication stems from a New Keynesian concern 
with transparency, some have suggested that transparency is not appropriate when it 
reveals central bank uncertainty (see Eusepi 2005, Morris and Shin 2002). In the case of 
difference of opinion within the committee, Blinder et al (2009) express concern that the 
effect will be noisy signals. In particular, difference of opinion for them represents 
uncertainty within the committee, which provokes uncertainty in markets. The explicit 
discussion of variety of opinion in the mainstream literature with respect to monetary 
policy builds on the somewhat older model uncertainty literature. Thus Gerlach-Kristen 
(2003) discusses variety of opinion in terms of additive and multiplicative uncertainty. 
But there has in addition been considerable discussion about model uncertainty, which 
refers to an inability to identify the one best model of the economy, and the true 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. While not put this way, implicitly there is 
clearly scope for variety of opinion as to which is the best model. And indeed this would 
be consistent with Blinder’s reference to difference of approach. Yet this literature also 
puts forward procedures for selecting from this variety (either using robust control 
theory, or else selecting the best from a range of possible models). The aim is still to 
identify one best model. Otherwise, in the wider literature, variety of opinion is apparent 
in the argument that one is superior to another (the model being put forward is the best 
model). To complicate matters further we know that the models used by playmakers and 
practitioners are influenced by each others’ signals. Economic agents formulate their 
decisions taking into account both information from monetary policy behaviour and 
signals coming from the financial market, thus forming a widespread belief about the 
future course of the events. It is these beliefs that, in turn, influence market dynamics and 
the monetary authorities’ reaction. This intuition is based on the idea that the probability 
assigned by agents to the realisation of future events is the result of a complex process 
based on the observation of those variables that are considered relevant. As discussed 
below, this intuition finds support in Keynes’s probability theory. 
 
While on the one hand Blinder (2008) therefore advises against transparency about 
difference of opinion within the committee, he nevertheless identifies ‘variety of 
approach’ among members of monetary policy committees as a strength of the committee 
system. In fact in recent general commentaries on the state of economics as a whole, 
variety of opinion is identified as a welcome feature of the current state of thinking 
(Colander, 2000 and Goodwin, 2000). Indeed such variety has been likened to that 
offered by free markets (Pencavel 1991). But, however persuasive the metaphor, the 
notion of a market in ideas is highly problematic, and begs numerous methodological 
questions. The fundamental problem with this general position on variety is that it lacks 
methodological justification, or indeed explanation, and risks veering into an ‘anything 
goes’ methodological territory (Dow 2007). Meanwhile practitioners proceed broadly 
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speaking along traditional logical positivist lines, aiming to identify the one model which 
is best in terms of internal deductivist logic and in terms of conformity with data.  
 
Given the difficulty of simultaneously satisfying the two requirements of consistent 
internal logic and conformity with the data, we find two routes in the literature towards 
identifying the one best model. The theoretical route requires models which apply 
deductive logic to axioms of rational individual behaviour, while the empirical route 
seeks confirmation that particular models are consistent with the data. There is clearly 
variety of opinion as to the nature of the axioms (given the new behavioural economics), 
and to the primacy to be given to logical consistency on the one hand and empirical 
confirmation on the other. Yet all concerned profess to seek models which are both 
consistent with satisfactory axioms and are also empirically confirmed. The implication is 
that a consensus will emerge in due course. 
 
There is further a contrast between the academic practitioner literature on monetary 
policy on the one hand and accounts of the actual practice of monetary policy on the 
other. The former aims to identify the one best model from which a definitive policy 
stance could be derived, while, even though there may be agreement on the one best core 
model, the latter reserves a key role for judgement. It is in the exercise of judgement in 
implementing the results of the model that scope for variety of opinion is seen to arise. 
While Gerlach-Kristen for example refers to differences in skill set and access to 
information as explaining variety of opinion, the implication remains that, the better the 
skills and the fuller the information, the closer the decision will be to the correct one, ie 
the correct judgement applied to the best model. The nature of judgement remains 
unexplored and unexplained. In fact, the implicit assumption is that given the right skills 
and full information, no further judgement is required since the rational conclusion will 
be foregone. 
 
When practitioners discuss the difficulties in applying judgement, they refer to the 
uncertainties in the real world, compared to the certainties of the models they use (King   
2007). For policy makers in particular, the relation between models and the world in 
which policy is to be applied is crucial. Here the methodological literature can make a 
particular contribution to the practical problems faced by policy-makers.4 For example, 
the critical realist literature in economic methodology has drawn attention to ontological 
assumptions, and the need to bring them to the surface (Lawson 1997). In this 
terminology, seeking one best model which can then be tested against independent data is 
a 'closed-system' approach, which is only appropriate to a subject matter which is 
similarly closed, i.e. predictions on the basis of models based on the past can only be 
relied upon if there is no force for change in internal relations, eg between individuals, or 
in institutional structure (intrinsic closure), and no force for change impinges from 
outside the system, where ‘the system’ includes shocks known to be random (extrinsic 
                                                 
4 It is worth pointing out that, alongside model uncertainty, policymakers and practitioners face a good deal 
of uncertainty about the current and future position of the economy; policy decisions are taken considering 
current and forecast data which are subject to a high degree of uncertainty. 
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closure). Thus, in a way, prediction remains possible in a (stochastically) determinist 
system.  
 
If rather the subject matter is subject to fundamental uncertainty (essentially 'open'), then 
formal models which, by definition, cannot take account of unanticipated change to the 
subject matter, are an insufficient guide for prediction and thus for action. Theory should 
instead be geared to identifying as far as possible the underlying tendencies which 
generate what we observe and experience, where these tendencies may not always be 
operative, and may operate in conflicting directions. The best we can hope for then is 
judgements as to the nature and effect of tendencies judged to operate in particular 
circumstances. If formal modelling is insufficient, then other methods must also be 
employed. Rather than a last step after modelling, judgement as to other sources of 
knowledge and how to combine them are integral to the methodology. Further, while 
Gerlach-Kristen (2006) talks about ideology as being encapsulated in policy goals and 
thus separable from analysis, ideology arguably is in fact embedded in understandings of 
the real world as well (Dow 2004c), or at least in ‘ontological commitments’ (Lawson 
2003). Blinder’s ‘difference of approach’, even when applied to a common goal (an 
inflation target) would thus extend from understanding of real processes to views about 
how to build knowledge about them. This pluralist approach to methodology (an 
acceptance of a range of internally valid methodologies), will ensure that variety of 
opinion will be the normal state of affairs. Indeed this is inevitable once we move away 
from any notion of ‘one best model’. 
 
The scope for variety of opinion is something explicitly identified by Keynes, and thus 
explicitly analysed by those drawing on Keynes in the modern literature (Carabelli 2008, 
Dow 2007, Dow and Ghosh, forthcoming). In his Treatise on Probability, Keynes set out 
to establish the grounds for belief in propositions in the general case where the conditions 
for applying classical logic in decision making were not satisfied. This general case is 
one of fundamental uncertainty (which cannot be reduced to calculable risk) where any 
knowledge held can at most be held with uncertainty. The alternative being ignorance, we 
still generally hold some knowledge, differentiated by the level of confidence we place in 
it. In the absence of the conditions allowing unequivocal decision-making on the basis of 
classical rationality, inevitably variety of opinion will arise, and any decisions arrived at 
will result from substantive judgement on the part of decision makers. As Keynes (1921: 
3-4) writes: 
 
All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge of them depends on our 
circumstances; and while it is often convenient to speak of propositions as certain 
or probable, this expresses strictly a relationship in which they stand to a corpus 
of knowledge, actual or hypothetical and not a characteristic of the propositions in 
themselves. […] The theory of probability is logical, therefore, because it is 
concerned with the degree of belief which it is rational to entertain in given 
conditions, and not merely with actual beliefs of particular individuals which may 
or may not be rational. 
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In addition to the general epistemological argument for difference of opinion under 
conditions of fundamental uncertainty, Carabelli (2008) argues specifically that variety of 
opinion can arise for the same reasons put forward in the conventional monetary policy 
literature: different levels of skill and knowledge. She contrasts the reliance primarily on 
convention, in the face of ignorance on the part of individual investors, on the one hand, 
with the greater skill and knowledge of speculators (not that their predictions are 
necessarily correct). Arguably, the authorities too have access to partly-unique skills and 
knowledge in analysing the economy from their macro perspective. Weight of any 
argument within the MPC may therefore be expected to be higher than elsewhere. There 
may further be significant relations between these groups, and their different knowledges. 
Earl, Peng and Potts (2007) apply Simon’s heuristics approach to analysing the 
investment behaviour of different groups in terms of cascading strategies. Experienced 
and creative speculators will develop a sophisticated strategy, eg for switching into real 
estate of particular types at particular times. Other market dealers with skills and 
information will adopt simpler versions of this heuristic as a sophisticated convention, 
and so on down to generally unskilled and uninformed investors who will adopt a crude 
conventional strategy such as ‘buy real estate’. 
 
Where there is not complete ignorance (‘we simply do not know’), there are some 
reasons for judgements. There is more confidence in judgment (less uncertainty) where 
weight of argument is high, ie where there is relatively more relevant evidence which can 
be brought to bear – even if it supports different opinions. This view of uncertainty differs 
critically from the standard view, as expressed for example by Gerlach-Kristen (2003) 
and King (2007), who identify uncertainty with difference of opinion. The relative (ie 
ordinal) probability attached to belief in a particular outcome may be low, in the 
Keynesian system, but the more relevant evidence has been brought to bear, the less is 
the uncertainty attached to that probability. 
 
But, as Carabelli argues, individual reasons may be incommensurate, so that probabilities 
cannot be compared at all. (Indeed, where there are multiple goals, incommensurability 
of goals exacerbates the difficulty in settling on a policy.) This explains the essence of 
Keynes’s method – it is aimed at addressing incommensurability. It is a pluralist method, 
drawing on formal models, verbal argumentation and different types of evidence about 
different forces which are deemed to be at work, designed to produce practical (rather 
than fully demonstrable) reasons for action. This pluralism is given coherence by the kind 
of argument brought to bear, since this will limit the range of types of evidence and its 
interpretation (what Dow, 2004b, terms ‘structured pluralism’). But if different members 
of the policy committee approach the decision not just from different levels of skill and 
assessment of uncertain data, but more generally from different underlying economic 
world views, the reasons they will produce will be incommensurate at a very fundamental 
level. Clarity is only possible when these different foundations are brought to the surface 
and addressed explicitly (as in accounts of Godley’s different approach to the other ‘wise 
men’ in the 1980s; see Evans 1997). 
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Inevitably there will be variety of opinion, as different parties draw on different reasons 
which cannot be directly compared, even within a common ontology and epistemology. 
But if there are good reasons (with evidential weight) put forward by some for raising 
interest rates, together with good reasons (with evidential weight) put forward by others 
to lower them, then the committee can be confident in the judgement that there should be 
no change. On the other hand, if evidential weight is low, then the uncertainty attached to 
the various reasons put forward is high, and this too will encourage holding rates – but 
this time as a form of inaction rather than a positive decision to hold. What emerges is 
thus an institutionalised process of collective judgement in which explicit argument 
among committee members obtains central place in arriving at collective judgement the 
outcomes of which can be held in confidence of the soundness of this institutionalised 
process. 
 
We turn now to consider explicitly the case of the MPC in order to formulate some more 
concrete hypotheses as to decision-making under uncertainty, which might then be 
considered in relation to evidence.  
 
Variety of Judgement in the MPC 
The MPC of the Bank of England is given an inflation target by the government 
(currently 2% growth in CPI over a two-year time-horizon), with an obligation to provide 
a written explanation if inflation departs from this target by more than two percentage 
points. The Committee consists of nine members, four of whom are appointed directly by 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer. With the support of Bank of England research staff, the 
MPC produces a quarterly Inflation Report (in February, May, August and November), 
which presents an agreed analysis of economic conditions and an agreed forecast of 
inflation and output which now extends beyond the two-year target period in order to 
show trends. The assertion that the analysis and forecasts are consensual (see Tucker 
2008) is consistent with the Blinder and Gerlach-Kristen perspective, that difference of 
opinion does not have ideological roots, but is rather the product of difference of skill and 
information base. The Governor has a press conference on the publication of the Report, 
with exchanges with the press following on an opening statement. 
 
The MPC meets monthly to decide on the level of the repo rate. The rate is announced 
with a press statement explaining the decision. The Minutes of the MPC discussion are 
not however made public until two weeks after the meeting. The votes are recorded, so 
that any dissent from the majority is made evident, and reasons given. The MPC therefore 
falls into Blinder’s category of an individualistic committee. Variety of opinion is 
relatively transparent, and is further communicated through the speeches of the individual 
members. 
 
The Inflation  Report forecasts are displayed in ‘fan charts’, rather than as points, 
reflecting a probability distribution of risks based both on past errors, and on the MPC’s 
judgement as to the amplitude and skewness of risks. Being quantified, what is being 
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represented is risk, not the fundamental uncertainty we have been discussing above 
(which, by definition, cannot be quantified). The term uncertainty is often applied to the 
fan charts (see eg Elder et al 2005). But our analysis of the MPC’s use of the term 
‘uncertainty’, compared to the term ‘risk’, in the Minutes of the monthly MPC meetings 
suggests that the MPC does use the two terms to reflect different concepts (Dow, Klaes 
and Montagnoli, forthcoming). Our work also supports the understanding that the MPC 
takes positive action more frequently in Inflation Report months when, arguably, 
understanding of risk is better (being more informed) and uncertainty lower, other things 
being equal. 
 
What we are concerned with here is the relation between variety of opinion and 
uncertainty. The conventional literature, as we have seen, implies that the two may go 
together, reflecting an imperfect process by which different members arrive at what will 
ultimately prove to be the ‘correct’ judgement. From this perspective, diversity of voting 
record is an indicator of uncertainty. 
 
Our analysis however suggests something rather different. We have argued that 
difference of opinion may stem from different understandings of the workings of the 
economy and different views as to how to build knowledge. But even where these are 
shared, no one model is sufficient as a reasoned basis for policy decision – rather 
judgement needs to be applied, and applied to a range of sources of knowledge (a 
pluralist position at times espoused by the MPC; see Bank of England 1999). Since there 
is no unitary theory of judgement (and we would not expect to find one within a pluralist 
approach), or mechanism for rendering incommensurate evidence and arguments 
commensurate, variety of opinion brought to judgement is thus the norm. 
 
Where variety of judgement is the norm, each opinion may in fact be held with low 
uncertainty, being based on a significant body of evidence (as in Inflation Report 
months). If there are good reasons both for a rise and for a fall in the repo rate for 
example, then a collective judgement, held with a high degree of confidence, may suggest 
no change. Uncertainty is relatively low, even though measured risk may be high; only 
significant weight of evidence can justify attempts to quantify risk. Indeed, since most 
difference of opinion in practice has been skewed (dissent tending to be only in one 
direction or another from the majority view) difference of opinion is as likely to be 
associated with positive action as with inaction.  
 
On the other hand, when there is low weight of argument in general, the reasons for any 
policy decision are weak, whether or not there is disagreement among committee 
members. Where confidence in reasons for decisions is low, the ability to assess risk in 
such circumstances will also be low. Even if the reasons put forward are different, and 
pointing to conflicting tendencies (and thus supporting different policy moves), there may 
be general agreement on the high level of uncertainty and therefore no positive action is 
taken. In other words uncertainty is more likely to be a characteristic of agreement on 
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uncertainty than of difference of opinion. It is also more likely to be associated with 
inaction.  
 
We can therefore infer a hypothesis as to the decision-making process. In particular, we 
can consider the factors which may explain a change of rate rather than no change. While 
there is inevitable ambiguity as to whether a no-change decision is an active decision (ie 
made with confidence) or a passive decision (ie made with a low level of confidence), we 
can draw on evidence as to the level of uncertainty perceived by the MPC in order to 
distinguish the two. The level of confidence, according to our analysis, will be a positive 
function of statements about risk, and a negative function of statements about uncertainty. 
Changes in the amplitude and skewness of the fans will also be a reflection of confidence 
about the assessment of risks. Where uncertainty by this measure is high, a unanimous 
vote will reflect agreement on uncertainty. Where it is low, it will be the outcome of 
reasons with high weight tending to point to tendencies in similar directions, or balanced 
in conflicting directions, in both cases supporting the same positive policy response 
(action and inaction respectively).  
 
In moving now to formalising the foregoing argument into a hypothesis about monetary 
policy decision-making, there is an important question about operationalising the 
variables we identify. We have been dealing in concepts whose full meanings, by their 
nature, defy quantitative capture. Judgement, for example, goes beyond application of 
mathematical models. The incommensurability of arguments by definition prevents 
reducing them to comparable forms of expression. Uncertainty similarly is the outcome 
of low weight of argument, where arguments are incommensurate. The evidence on 
judgement and uncertainty on the part of the MPC, further, itself comes in 
incommensurate forms: texts in the form of the Minutes, the Inflation Report, speeches 
by MPC members, and the wording of the press conference – even the body language of 
the Governor when expressing carefully pre-prepared wording. It is because of this 
incommensurability of communication that the nature and content of central bank 
communication has become such an important topic for study. Monetary policy no longer 
is seen as encapsulated simply in the announcement of an official rate. 
 
In Dow, Klaes and Montagnoli (forthcoming) we took a first step at identifying risk and 
uncertainty variables from the MPC Minutes, using simple word counts. But the next step 
in that analysis will extend the identification of risk and uncertainty, using more complex 
indicators of risk and uncertainty as in the conventional literature, using discourse 
analysis. For the purposes of this paper, we keep the analysis here at a more conceptual 
level for the time being. (The next step for this analysis will be to settle on a way of 
identifying uncertainty from the MPC Minutes which will go beyond simple word 
counts.) Our aim is to provide more focus for the analysis above by indicating how we 
might identify the decision-making process of the MPC. 
 
What we have argued is that the MPC is more inclined to take action the more confident 
it is in its arguments, and the more the various (generally incommensurate) arguments 
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brought to the table by the different members of the MPC point in the direction of the 
same action (where action may be either a change or no-change in the repo rate). The 
arguments will be held with more confidence, the greater the weight of evidence attached 
to them. High weight is also associated with detailed, and confident, assessment of the 
risks attached to forecasts, since this reflects greater knowledge. Other things being 
equal, then, action is more likely in Inflation Report months (ie quarterly), when there is 
more detailed and public MPC discussion of the forecasts and the risks attached to them. 
While action could include a positive decision, made with confidence, not to change the 
repo rate, there is no doubt that ‘change’ is synonymous with action, while ‘no change’ 
includes inaction as well as action. And indeed empirical studies do support the 
hypothesis that change is more likely in Inflation Report months (see Dow, Klaes and 
Montagnoli, forthcoming).  
 
But each MPC member may attach significant evidential weight to his or her own 
reasoning (as in Inflation Report months), and yet there may be diversity of opinion as to 
which arguments should dominate. Such diversity is easily identified by diversity of 
voting among the MPC members (although unanimous voting may conceal underlying 
differences). Since lines of reasoning beyond the core model will be to some degree at 
least incommensurate, a diversity of strongly-held opinions will discourage action, while 
unanimity will encourage action. Again, while action could consist of no change in rate, a 
change in rate is unambiguously a form of action. 
 
We are arguing that a change in repo rate, therefore, will be associated with two factors: 
high weight of argument (high confidence, including confidence in risk assessment, and 
thus low uncertainty) and unanimity of opinion within the MPC. 
 
No change in the repo rate however can have a wider range of explanations. There may 
be high confidence in judgement (including judgement as to risk assessment) on the part 
of each member of the MPC, but diversity of argument such that conflicting views are 
confidently held, so that no resolution can be reached. Then the group decision will be no 
change. Alternatively the arguments brought forward may be clouded by uncertainty, the 
evidential weight and the capacity to assess risk being low. Yet if there is agreement that 





Ever since the failure of the confident days of the early 1980s when it was presumed that 
a single large model would unambiguously yield the appropriate policy action, the 
complexity of monetary policy has found increasing emphasis in the various strands of 
literature on monetary policy. To a significant part, this complexity arises not just from 
the fact the economic phenomena under study are complex, but also from the 
epistemological difficulties of arriving at an accurate and reliable representation of these 
phenomena for the purposes of policy analysis. 
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We have argued that while, in much of the monetary policy literature, discussions of 
these difficulties restrict themselves to model uncertainty conventionally understood, it is 
vital to acknowledge a more radical form of model uncertainty that arises if several 
alternative models or model interpretations are conceivable concurrently but 
incommensurably so. In such a context, what is at stake is not simply the reliability of 
economic data feeding these models, but the fundamental structure of these models 
themselves. 
 
Differential availability of economic data is typically addressed as an information 
problem in conventional analysis, giving rise to variety of opinion among economic 
agents, policy makers, and economic analysts. Our emphasis has sought to shift the focus 
to the implications of model uncertainty arising from incommensurability of models of 
the economy, and therefore from variety of opinion to variety of economic judgement. 
Economic judgement becomes important in the absence of technical grounds to choose 
between competing models. Its role is particularly significant when there is high 
uncertainty regarding the state of the economy. 
 
We have studied the variety of economic judgement on the basis of the institutional 
structure of monetary policy-making in the UK, where such decision making is not only 
delegated to a committee, but also this committee operates on the basis of majority voting 
and adheres to principles of transparency that ensure that the meeting Minutes are made 
available to the public. 
 
We have drawn out some implications of our general theory of economic judgement in 
monetary policy by tentatively formulating some hypotheses regarding the interaction of 
uncertainty, variety of judgement, and policy action. In particular, the conventional 
literature identifies MPC uncertainty with difference of judgement within the committee, 
and associates diversity of MPC opinion as ‘noise’ which creates market uncertainty. In 
principle this difference in judgement is seen as being reducible through pooling 
information. In contrast, we have identified two alternative possibilities: conflicting 
judgements, where each position is held with low uncertainty on the one hand, and 
agreement within the committee on uncertainty on the other. Uncertainty may be reduced 
by more relevant evidence, but cannot be eliminated, given open-system nature of the 
subject matter. Further, since judgement generally requires drawing on a range of 
incommensurate arguments, communication may be more clear the better these different 
arguments are articulated. 
 
More specifically, we have suggested that the level of confidence, according to our 
analysis, will be a positive function of statements about risk, and a negative function of 
statements about uncertainty. If there are good reasons both for a rise and for a fall in the 
repo rate, a collective judgement, held with a high degree of confidence, may suggest no 
change. On the other hand, when there is low weight of argument in general, the reasons 
for any policy decision are weak. Where confidence in reasons for decisions is low, the 
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ability to assess risk in such circumstances will also be low. Even if the reasons put 
forward are different, and pointing to conflicting tendencies (and thus supporting 
different policy moves), there may be general agreement on the high level of uncertainty 
and therefore no positive action is taken. In other words uncertainty is more likely to be a 
characteristic of agreement than of difference of opinion. It is also more likely to be 
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